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Unionism	Vs	self-interest:	would	MPs	support
Proportional	Representation?
In	light	of	the	electoral	divergence	between	the	UK’s	constituent	nations,	and	the	real	danger	of	a
break-up	of	the	Union,	Klaus	Stolz	makes	the	case	for	Proportional	Representation.	He	explains,
however,	that	reform	will	be	a	choice	between	the	collective	self-interest	of	Labour	and	Conservative
MPs	on	the	one	hand,	and	their	ideological	values	on	the	other.
Scholars	of	territorial	politics	have	long	seen	the	British	two-party	system	as	a	cornerstone	of
integration	in	the	multi-national	British	state.	The	persistent	failure	of	the	majoritarian	first-past-the-post	(FPTP)
electoral	system	to	translate	existing	territorial	divisions	into	meaningful	parliamentary	representation,	it	was	argued,
had	allowed	the	two	major	parties	–	Labour	and	the	Conservatives	–	to	manage	and	mediate	diverging	territorial
interests	internally,	keeping	separatist	forces	at	bay.
With	the	election	result	of	2015,	this	perception	has	lost	much	of	its	power.	Indeed,	the	apparent	integrating	function
of	the	British	party	system	has	been	a	myth	for	quite	some	time.	While	FPTP	may	have	helped	to	concentrate	votes
around	the	two	major	parties,	it	has	also	heavily	exaggerated	the	existing	electoral	divergence	between	different
parts	of	the	country,	contributing	to	the	disintegration	of	UK	politics.	As	this	effect	becomes	increasingly	obvious,
strong	commitment	to	British	union	might	be	expected	to	induce	corresponding	support	for	electoral	reform	in	both
the	Conservative	and	the	Labour	Party.	But	the	territorial	concentration	of	their	MPs	means	that	career	self-interest
points	instead	in	the	opposite	direction.
Electoral	Divergence	between	the	UK’s	constituent	nations
The	general	election	results	of	2015	and	2017	in	the	four	constituent	nations	revealed	an	astonishing	and
unprecedented	feature:	in	each	nation	a	different	political	party	leads	the	electoral	league	table.	While	this	is	an
absolute	first,	electoral	divergence	between	the	four	constituent	nations	is	far	from	new.	A	look	at	a	dissimilarity	index
for	England,	Scotland	and	Wales	(Northern	Ireland	always	had	its	own	distinct	party	system)	instead	shows	an
increasing	deviation	from	the	overall	UK	result,	though	based	on	rather	different	figures	across	nations	and	over
time:	up	until	the	1970s,	the	share	of	votes	cast	per	party	in	Scotland	was	rather	close	to	that	in	England	and	so	to
the	overall	UK	result.	It	was	Wales	that	provided	for	the	bulk	of	voter	deviation.
Yet	Welsh	deviation	has	remained	rather	constant,	while	Scottish	divergence	has	heavily	increased.	Thus,	both,	the
long-term	increase	since	the	1970s	and	the	current	upsurge	in	territorial	electoral	divergence	are	almost	exclusively
due	to	an	increasing	electoral	divergence	between	England	and	Scotland.	The	highly	different	voting	behaviour	of
citizens	in	England,	Scotland,	and	Wales	is	clearly	putting	the	strain	on	the	integrating	function	ascribed	to	both
major	parties	and	to	the	British	two-party	system.
Generally	seen	as	the	central	institutional	pillar	of	the	Labour-Conservative	duopoly,	the	FPTP	electoral	system	has
failed	to	protect	the	party	system	from	this	kind	of	territorial	divergence.	In	fact,	it	has	been	heavily	inflating	the
problem.	Scottish	and	Welsh	divergence	from	the	UK	result	in	terms	of	seats	won	per	party	has	generally	been
between	5	and	20	percentage	points	higher	than	the	corresponding	figure	for	votes	cast.	This	phenomenon	was
particularly	pronounced	during	the	1980s	and	has	reached	even	higher	figures	since	2005	with	a	peak	of	40
percentage	points	difference	(for	Scotland)	in	2015.
As	a	direct	result	of	this	effect,	Margaret	Thatcher	governed	the	UK	in	1987	with	the	support	of	less	than	20
Conservative	MPs	from	the	Celtic	periphery	(Scotland	10	and	Wales	8).	In	Scotland	(and	to	a	lesser	extent	in	Wales)
this	representational	deficit	was	perceived	as	undemocratic.	It	made	for	a	widespread	delegitimisation	of	the	British
political	system	and	provided	fertile	ground	for	Scottish	nationalism.
By	1997,	Conservative	representation	from	Scotland	and	Wales	was	even	down	to	zero	(!)	despite	winning	almost
20%	of	the	vote.	Due	to	FPTP,	the	Westminster	contingent	of	what	still	is	known	as	the	Conservative	and	Unionist
Party	had	thus	become	de	facto	an	English-only	party.	It	was	due	to	the	Proportional	Representation	(PR)	systems	in
the	devolved	parliaments	that	the	Conservatives	survived	as	a	meaningful	force	in	Scotland	and	Wales.
Scottish	separatism	and	the	Englishing	of	Britain’s	major	parties
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In	the	two	most	recent	general	elections	this	effect	reached	a	new	quality.	For	the	very	first	time,	FPTP	actually
worked	in	favour	of	a	separatist	party.	Passing	the	necessary	electoral	threshold	in	Scotland,	the	SNP	won	almost	all
Scottish	seats	on	just	half	of	the	Scottish	votes	in	2015,	and	still	managed	to	hold	on	to	an	absolute	majority	on	only
a	plurality	of	votes	in	2017.	The	system	that	had	long	excluded	the	party	from	any	meaningful	representation	at	the
UK	level	has	now	turned	the	SNP	into	the	dominant	Scottish	force	and	the	third	party	at	Westminster.
On	the	one	hand,	this	means	that	the	Scottish	voice	is	now	a	separatist	voice,	drowning	the	few	deviant	noises.
Territorial	division	has	reached	the	heart	of	the	British	Union.	On	the	other	hand,	this	also	deprives	both	major	British
parties	of	a	critical	mass	of	Scottish	MPs,	accountable	to	and	dependent	on	Scottish	voters.	In	fact,	despite	Labour’s
good	results	in	Wales,	the	Scottish	meltdown	of	2015	has	turned	Labour	at	Westminster	into	the	second
parliamentary	party	with	a	disproportionally	high	share	of	English	MPs	(89%	in	2015	and	87%	in	2017).
In	a	system	of	territorial	politics	that	has	long	depended	on	the	capacity	of	at	least	one	British	party	to	represent	and
mediate	peripheral	interests,	the	depicted	“Englishing”	of	both	major	British	parties	may	have	detrimental	effects.
With	their	“SNP	scare”	tactics	of	the	2015	electoral	campaign,	with	the	heavily	contested	introduction	of	EVEL	into
Westminster	parliamentary	procedures	and,	most	importantly,	with	their	uncompromising	adherence	to	the	unitary
principle	and	majority	rule	in	the	Brexit	process,	the	Conservatives	have	already	shown	a	lack	of	sensitivity	for
peripheral	demands	and	grievances.	There	is	little	doubt	that	the	parliamentary	Englishing	of	political	parties	is	also
increasing	their	temptation	to	openly	play	the	English	card	and	thus	to	further	reinforce	territorial	divisions.
Electoral	system	reform	vs.	MPs	career	self-interest
One	obvious	way	to	avoid	this	artificial	augmentation	of	territorial	divisions	is	to	reform	the	electoral	system.	Of
course,	such	a	move	would	not	automatically	cure	the	underlying	social	and	political	divisions,	but	PR	would	at	least
temper	the	institutional	expression	of	these	divisions,	enhance	the	capacity	for	territorial	interest	accommodation
within	the	major	British	parties,	and	facilitate	non-divisive	territorial	politics.	As	this	mechanism	becomes	more
apparent,	the	persistent	unionism	of	Labour	and	Conservatives,	together	with	the	real	danger	of	a	break-up	of	the
Union	might	indeed	help	to	overcome	the	traditional	resistance	of	both	parties	to	electoral	reform.
The	main	obstacle	to	this,	however,	remains	the	collective	self-interest	of	their	MPs.	While	the	adoption	of	a	PR
system	would	increase	the	chances	of	Conservative	and	Labour	candidates	to	re-enter	Westminster	in	Scotland	and
Wales	(for	the	Conservatives),	the	number	of	English	seats	to	be	won	by	these	parties	and	thus	the	re-election
chances	of	their	incumbent	English	MPs	would	clearly	be	reduced.	For	unionist	politicians,	the	issue	of	electoral
reform	can	therefore	be	framed	as	a	decision	between	their	core	values	and	their	career	self-interest.	It	remains	to	be
seen	which	principle	will	prevail.
_________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	British	Politics.
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